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Abstract and Keywords
This chapter opens with a social constructionist perspective on human essences. As pro­
posed, essences are not given in nature, but constructed within cultural traditions. Thus, 
the major challenge is not that of “getting it right” about the essence, but generating ac­
counts that may contribute to society. A criterion of reflective pragmatism is proposed in 
which questions of contribution and critique prevail. In this light the chapter places in 
critical light the bio-cognitive and neurological explanations of human nature, especially 
focusing on the ideological and political implications of these orientations. In contrast, 
discussion opens on relational conceptions of human essence. Several approaches are 
considered, including symbolic interactionism and object relations theory in psychoanaly­
sis. However, a fully relational account abandons the individual as the fundamental unit of 
analysis in favor of relational process out of which the very conception of the individual is 
formed (or not). Several practical implications are treated including the potentials of rela­
tional responsibility
Keywords: bio-cognitive explanation, culture, reflective pragmatism, discourse analysis, essentialism, human na­
ture, social construction, evolution, neurological explanation, relational responsibility
Scientific questions can be both productive and pernicious. To ask a question is to invite a 
reply, and under certain conditions such a reply might open new and exciting domains of 
inquiry and practice. Such is the case when we have asked about why objects fall to the 
earth, or inquired into the causes and cures of various diseases. Yet one must also be 
careful about the formulation of questions, as these formulations carry with them a 
penumbra of typically unarticulated assumptions. Psychologists have long inquired, for 
example, into the causes and cures of mental illness. The question seems productive 
enough. However, in the teaming energies devoted to answering such a question we have 
largely overlooked the hidden assumptions that there is indeed “mental illness” in the 
world, that human action is “caused,” that people labeled as mentally ill are defective, 
and that such people should be subjected to “cure.” Such assumptions are then dissemi­
nated into the culture, used by people to understand themselves, employed as corner­
stones for professions such as psychiatry and clinical psychology, and realized in the poli­
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cies of hospitals and insurance companies; they also stimulate the development of phar­
maceuticals. The result is a steady expansion in diagnostic labels for mental illness, a 
mushrooming population of the “mentally ill,” and billions of dollars spent (p. 248) on 
drugs with no direct curative effects (Moncrief, 2009; Whitaker, 2010).
It is in this context that I wish to address the question of human essence. What is it that 
makes us fundamentally who we are? What, at the core, moves and motivates us? This is 
scarcely a new question. Most relevant to the present volume, the idea of an inner source 
of action can be traced to Aristotle’s Da Anima. As he reasoned, there must be an active 
force that animates the otherwise lifeless body. To this force he assigned the concept of 
what is generally translated as psyche. The psyche possesses the “power of producing 
both movement and rest.” Over later centuries the concept was incorporated into Christ­
ian theology as “the soul.” To commit a sin, within this tradition, is to act voluntarily, thus 
bringing the soul into a state of impurity. With the Enlightenment, the concept of soul was 
secularized and reconceptualized as the mind. It was left largely to 20th century psychol­
ogy to re-define Aristotle’s psyche in a manner congenial with a positivist science. For 
psychologists, then, the question of human essence has typically been framed in terms of 
human nature, with debates variously organized around such antinomies as determinism 
versus free will, mechanistics versus humanistics, nature versus nurture, biological ver­
sus social determinants of behavior, and brain versus culture, among others. In each case 
the question has triggered vast new worlds of theory and research. Yet interesting to say, 
no clear and compelling answers have been forthcoming. Despite a century of empirical 
research, we remain locked in the same mystery of “What is it that causes us to behave as 
we do?”
In the present volume on human essences, the wheel turns once again, and we are intro­
duced to an array of more recently accumulated orientations to this eternal question. 
However, rather than providing yet another answer, my aims in the present chapter are 
two-fold: First I wish to focus first on the very question: What are the assumptions behind 
the question of essences, could they be otherwise, and what would be the consequences? 
Here I wish to contrast the realist assumption that traditionally anchors the question of 
essence with a social constructionist orientation to knowledge. This discussion will give 
way to a critical examination of the now dominant bio/cognitive orientation to essences in 
psychology. If we reflect on the social consequences of this orientation, as a construction­
ist orientation invites, what is gained, what is lost? Then I shall outline the contours of a 
relational orientation to human essence. The focus shifts in this case from essences within
the person to the motivating power of relational process. This account is offered not as a 
truth posit, but with an eye to its generative potential for societal practices.
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Human Essence: Cultural Construction and 
Consequence
As suggested in the opening paragraph, any inquiry into essence must necessarily pro­
ceed from specific traditions of understanding, their prevailing distinctions, the ways in 
which questions are constituted, procedures for reaching answers, and agreements as to 
the range of reasonable answers. The discursive conventions constituting these traditions 
will necessarily lay the groundwork for all that can be properly said about the matter. 
Thus, experimental social psychologists will never locate in their data evidence for the 
soul, nor will a priest ever conclude from his experience with parishioners that sin is the 
product of the hypothalamus. In a broader sense this is to say that there is no “getting it 
right” with respect to the nature of human (p. 249) essences. We cannot step outside all 
traditions to ask questions and offer intelligible replies. Indeed, we may say that the very 
inquiry into essences itself derives from a tradition of understanding. It is not a question 
that must be answered in order for us to achieve fundamental knowledge or an accurate 
picture of our condition in the world. Human essence is, after all, a “conversational ob­
ject,” and inquiry into its character is optional.
These preliminary remarks are in no sense intended to demean the pursuit of the ques­
tion. Rather, it is to invite even more serious attention to the issues at stake. As reasoned, 
accuracy in the matter cannot be our goal. We cannot measure our discourses about hu­
man essence against a set of observations, such that we can determine whether one per­
spective is more accurate than another. What constitutes a fact or a relevant observation 
in one tradition will fail to do so in another. This has indeed been a major source of inde­
terminacy in debates between anti-abortionists and women’s rights advocates. The for­
mer offer physiological evidence that a fetus becomes a human being soon after concep­
tion, while the latter eschew such evidence on the grounds that anti-abortionists bring an­
thropomorphic biases into their tissue readings. Empirical evidence is only evidence with­
in a paradigm of understanding, and these paradigms can be lethal in their consequence. 
More broadly, this is to say that discussions about what is or is not human nature are, 
then, entries into moral and political deliberation. Or as Schwartz (1987) has put it, 
“Moral language is only sensible when applied to full-fledged people, and our understand­
ing of the facts of human nature tells us who the full-fledged people are” (p. 311). We 
move, then, from accuracy as our criterion of concern, to societal consequences. What 
happens to our lives together on this planet when we place in motion a particular concep­
tion of human essence? Who gains, who loses, what happens to the quality of our lives 
and our relations with our surrounds? These are questions that themselves require an­
swers from differing perspectives—each with its own assumptions, values, rationalities, 
and evidence. Required is indeed an open and continuing deliberation on what is the 
good.
In what follows I wish to bring critical attention to two accounts of human essence within 
contemporary scholarship. My concern is first with the confluence of cognitive, neurologi­
cal and evolutionary/genetic conceptions of the human being that increasingly enter pub­
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lic deliberations on society’s future. I will then turn to a more recent development in the 
social sciences, namely a broad movement to re-conceptualize human essence in more so­
cial or relational terms. When understood in its radical form, we find that it is indeed re­
lational process out of which the significance of “being human” emerges. As I will pro­
pose, a relational answer to the question of “what is human essence” has significant 
promise for future global life.
Human Essence as Bio-Cognitive
Consciousness, like digestion, is a property of biological tissue.
John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind
There are numerous treatments of the ways in which psychologists have conceptualized 
human functioning over the past century (see, for example, Shotter, 1975; Leary, 1990). 
However, to underscore the socio-political significance of such conceptions, I wish to fo­
cus on a contemporary movement within psychology. It is a movement of particular im­
portance because it represents the confluence of three (p. 250) longstanding metaphors of 
human nature and resultantly acquires substantial weight of authority. By taking a critical 
look at this movement, we will also be prepared to consider the relational developments 
to follow.
My concern, then, is with the emerging confluence among the cognitive, neurological, 
and evolutionary/genetic orientations to essence. Historically, the three orientations have 
not only tended toward separation but even antagonism. The cognitive view of human ac­
tion holds that the chief determinants of behavior are located within ratiocinative systems 
such as thought, memory, planning, intending, and so on. Traditionally such views were 
allied with 19th century mentalism along with methods of introspection and theories of 
mental chemistry. In turn, this orientation to “the essence of human functioning” can be 
traced to Enlightenment conceptions of people as conscious agents of their own destiny. 
However, owing chiefly to the development of the computer in the waning decades of the 
21st century, the cognitive vision of human nature turned mechanistic. With the conjoin­
ing of cognitive research and artificial intelligence programs, one could begin to under­
stand all mental functioning in terms of computer mechanisms (i.e., information process­
ing systems).
It was this latter move that established the groundwork for the subsequent alliance with 
the neurological vision of human essence. Psychological science had long resisted tenden­
cies toward neurological explanation, as such explanation would ultimately mean the 
demise of psychology. If all mental states can be reduced to physiological states, and 
physiological processes can be observed in a way that psychological processes cannot, 
then psychological descriptions can be dismissed as so much folklore. However, with the 
mechanistic turn in cognitive psychology, the way was opened toward a congenial paral­
lelism. That is, because both cognitive and physiological systems could be understood 
mechanistically, then it was inviting to see the two languages as describing “the same 
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thing,” only at different levels of functioning. Psychologists thus acquired important 
rhetorical support from a “natural science,” and the way was open for neurological scien­
tists to appropriate an entire field of scientific psychology. With the development of brain 
scanning methods, researchers could (misleadingly) demonstrate where in the cortex var­
ious cognitive processes occur. Cognitive-neuroscience now dominates the landscape of 
psychological inquiry.
Evolutionary views of human essence have long had a voice in psychological science, but 
not always a favored one. Early in the 20th century, evolutionary theory—as a theory of 
instincts—enjoyed a certain prominence. However, with the hegemony of behaviorism, in­
stinct explanations grew out of fashion. Not only did such explanations fly in the face of 
the optimistic vision of behaviorists, to whit, that all human behavior could be shaped for 
the better. But explanations by “instinct” seemed to superficially circumvent the real chal­
lenge of understanding how behavior patterns were acquired and extinguished in society. 
With the emergence of socio-biology in the latter half of the century, a form of instinct 
theory once again began to acquire status (Wilson, 2004). The fact that evolutionary ac­
counts of human behavior could be congenially allied with developments in behavior ge­
netics added significant weight to such explanations. And when fledgling cognitivists re­
quired fuel for undoing the behaviorist establishment in psychology, inherentist theories 
such as these became valuable allies. To the extent that the organism is genetically pre­
pared to act in various (p. 251) ways, behaviorist views of environmental determinism are 
undone. The determinants of human action successfully shifted from environmentalist 
(“bottom up”) to nativist (“top down.”). And the biological basis of both evolutionary and 
neurological theory facilitated an alliance - even if superficial - among cognitive, neuro­
logical, and evolutionary perspectives.
At least within the United States the confluence of the cognitive, neuro, and evolutionary/
genetic accounts of human nature constitute what many see as the core of contemporary 
psychological science. It is important to understand that none of the accumulated re­
search findings in these combined areas in any way furnish a foundation for this amalga­
mated vision of human essence. All such facts are generated from within discursive tradi­
tions already in place. Without this interpretive forestructure there would be no “con­
tributing facts.” How then might we evaluate this collective vision of human essence? As 
reasoned earlier, the important question concerns the socio-political implications. To what 
kind of society do we contribute when we understand human beings in just this way? 
These issues are especially significant, as this bio-cognitive perspective increasingly en­
ters into the conversations of the culture. This is so from the various public accounts of 
the brain basis for altruism, crime, leadership, and morality, for example, to evolutionary 
basis for religion, prejudice, and deception and to the increasing number of cases in 
which education is reconceptualized as “brain training.”
As many see it, the adverse implications of this bio-cognitive confluence are substantial 
(Bellah et al. 1985; Leary, 2007; Gergen, 2009). Humanists have long been concerned 
with the way in which deterministic visions such as this undermine the cultural assump­
tion of voluntary choice. With voluntarism impugned, we lose what many see as the es­
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sential capacity to hold individuals responsible for their actions. Such misgivings are in­
tensified in the present instance, because a reduction of human meaning to biological 
process would strip much of it of significance or value. If we were to replace the vocabu­
lary of emotion, for example, with the more precise vocabulary of neurological correlates, 
valued traditions would crumble. To replace the phrase, “I love you” with, “my medulla 
oblongata is stimulated by you,” for example, would undermine the entire tradition in 
which words of love play a pivotal role. This would include all terms of endearment, terms 
that solidify relations and build trust.
Yet the humanists are scarcely alone in their concerns. As many hold, there is implicit po­
litical conservatism of the bio-cognitive conception. If patterns of human behavior are 
prepared by evolution and locked into the nervous system, then our contemporary pat­
terns of behavior are more or less here to stay. Race prejudice, rape, oppression, and war 
are simply expressions or outcomes of human nature. Feminists have been particularly 
vociferous in their antagonism to such views, for evolutionary theory in particular is used 
to rationalize patterns of male promiscuity and aggression (Fausto-Sterling, 1985). In this 
sense, philandering and marital breakdown are simply among the enduring facts of life. 
Issues of morality or responsibility are largely irrelevant.
The bio-cognitive vision of human nature also has implications for policies of social con­
trol. By implication, undesirable behavior such as crime or dysfunctional behavior (e.g., 
“mental illness”) are locked into the nervous system. If we wish to eliminate crime, our 
best option is to remove “the criminal element” from the streets. Attention to such issues 
as economic disparity and ethnic prejudice are thus replaced (p. 252) with the develop­
ment of more punitive laws and larger prisons. In the case of socially dysfunctional be­
havior, the invitation is to “change the brain.” If a school child fails to pay attention, the 
likely result will be a diagnosis of ADHD and a prescription for AderoI. Neither the tech­
no-scape of the child nor the slow pace of traditional pedagogical practices are brought 
into question. In effect, the bio-cognitive orientation has contributed to a culture in which 
almost a tenth of the population either has or will be “treated” with psychotropic drugs.
Further, the bio-cognitive account of human nature discourages the envisioning of alter­
native futures. If we are hard wired to engage in deceit, oppression, and war, for exam­
ple, there is little reason to open deliberation on whether we might create alternative 
forms of life. We might reasonably think in terms of control by force, but discouraged is 
the active search for means of establishing ways of life in which these forms of activity 
would be unthinkable or rendered irrelevant.
Yet over and above these socio-political shortcomings, there is an overarching problem 
which bio-cognitive advocates share with much of the remainder of the field. It is essen­
tially a problem of boundaries. That is, the prevailing view of human essence treats the 
individual as a bounded being, one who possesses within (the body, the cortex, the mind, 
the genes) the major determinants of action. Or as Edward Sampson (2008) has put it, the 
vision is of a “self-contained individual” (p. 16). We are asked, then, to view society as 
composed of fundamentally separate or alienated entities, each seeking ends that are 
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largely self-sustaining or self-gratifying. We create the sense of a Hobbesian world of “all 
against all.” We come to believe that people’s concerns for others are highly delimited—
largely based on individual gratification (“enlightened individualism”) or the desire to 
perpetuate one’s genes. Concern with “myself” is also invited to ensure that we are not of 
lesser value than others and, more hopefully, “better than others.” Social life is thus rife 
with competition and anxiety over personal failure. And from this standpoint human rela­
tionships are artificial byproducts of otherwise separate individuals; human relationships 
are secondary to and derivative of individual actions. Relationships are to be valued only 
when one is unable to function autonomously. An instrumental orientation to others is in­
vited, in which we evaluate others in terms of “what can they do for me?” As many see it, 
this individualist ideology already undergirds many of our major institutions (education, 
law, and virtually all large organizations). We thus reap a harvest of conflict, anxiety, lone­
liness, conformity, manipulation, and exploitation.
The Human as Relational Being
Human beings are constituted in conversation.
Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self
It is one thing to fault psychology’s prevailing view of human essence for its individualist 
ideology. Yet it is quite another to formulate an alternative in which the “I” is replaced by 
the “we,” that is, in which relational process takes precedence over individual function­
ing. This is so, in part, because for over three centuries most all major conceptions of the 
human being in the West have shared in the presumption of bounded being. History has 
supplied over two thousand terms for psychological functioning, a vast number central to 
our everyday pursuits. It is difficult to imagine cultural life without reference to terms 
such as “thinking,” “believing,” “wanting,” “feeling,” and “intending.” If we are to speak 
of human essence all, we can scarcely leap out of these traditions. Even the traditional 
conception (p. 253) of relationship presumes the existence of at least two fundamentally 
separate elements that come together to form a relationship.
How, then, are we to formulate a viable and compelling account of human essence that 
makes intelligible our inherent interweaving and in which separation constitutes an un­
natural and artificial condition? Further, could we articulate a relational account that 
might sustain what is meaningful and valuable in cultural life, encourage innovation, and 
avoid tendencies toward conservatism and social control? Attempts to conceptualize the 
individual as a social actor have long been fixtures on the intellectual landscape (Burkitt, 
2008; Taylor, 1992; Curtis, 1991) Even those within the bio-cognitive tradition have 
searched for ways to link the self-contained elements of mind/brain to the social world. In 
perhaps the most ambitious of these attempts, van Zomeren (2016) posits a biologically 
prepared motivation to generate and successfully maintain social relationships.
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During the past decade, however, the hegemony of the bio-cognitive view, and the mount­
ing critiques of this view, have ignited a new wave of socially-centered theories (Kirschn­
er and Martin, 2010). While providing significant resources for seeing human essence as 
relational, there are also significant differences among theoretical positions. These differ­
ences have important socio-political implications. For analytic purposes it is useful to con­
sider three lines of thought, varying in terms of their congeniality with traditional individ­
ualism as opposed to the primacy of relationship. Consideration of the first two will be 
brief, as it is the third that is most radical in its essentializing of relationship.
Individuals as Cultural Carriers
That persons are influenced by their cultural surrounds is a virtual truism for psychology. 
This was most obviously the case during the halcyon years of behaviorism and still re­
mains vital in many areas of psychology. Yet relational reconstructions radically alter our 
understanding of this process. As outlined earlier, the presumption prevails in contempo­
rary psychology that the individual is endowed with certain psychological structures or 
processes. For the behaviorist the human learns about the external world, but the funda­
mental process of learning is not thereby altered; for cognitivists the external world pro­
vides raw resources for appropriation by neurologically based cognitive appetites. In nei­
ther case is the mental fundament itself produced, extinguished, or transformed by the 
social world. It is precisely this latter move that characterizes a range of recent attempts 
at relational reconstitution. As variously reasoned, it is not the self-contained individual 
who precedes culture, but the culture that establishes the basic character of psychologi­
cal functioning.
Vygotsky’s (1978) theory provided the initial stimulus for this line of reasoning. More re­
cently, Bruner’s (1993) influential work has drawn sustenance from Vygotsky in proposing 
that “it is culture, not biology, that shapes human life and the human mind, that gives 
meaning to action by situating its underlying intentional states in an interpretive 
system” (p. 34). Similarly, James Gee (1992) argues that “the individual interprets experi­
ence by forming “folk theories,” which together with nonlinguistic modules of the mind, 
cause the person to talk and act in certain ways . . .” (p. 104). These attempts to concep­
tualize individual process begin to undermine the bifurcation between self and other. Our 
very essence is that of cultural carrier.
Yet for many, such theorizing remains insufficient. There is, first of all, the paramount 
question of how the mind can be (p. 254) culturally formed. As I have argued elsewhere 
(Gergen, 1994), if all mental process is built up from social process, then we are left with­
out an account of how this “building of the mind” can get under way. Presumably the indi­
vidual would have no mental processes to enable him or her to understand and absorb 
the lessons of the culture. In effect, if the mind is a “blank slate,” how can the social 
world be comprehended? Yet if mental process is required in order to understand the so­
cial world, then the mental must precede the social. The social view of the individual 
threatens to collapse. On the socio-political level, many also find the view of humans as 
cultural carriers too deterministic. If our actions are supplied and made intelligible by a 
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cultural tradition that precedes us, it is difficult to understand how change is possible. If 
all one has available is cultural tradition, then how can one use the tradition to escape its 
grasp? Radical innovation is impossible.
Inter-subjective Selves
Selves can only exist in relationship to other selves.
George Herbert Mead, Mind, Self and Society
Among the first psychological accounts of the self as fundamentally relational were those 
of Charles Horton Cooley (1902) and George Herbert Mead (1934). For Cooley one’s con­
ception of self was a reflection of other’s views of oneself. In effect, the sense of self was 
inextricably woven into the social milieu. George Herbert Mead’s classic work Mind, self 
and society provided a far more sophisticated account of this process. As Mead proposed, 
there is no thinking, or indeed any sense of being a self, that is independent of social 
process. For Mead, we are born with rudimentary capacities to adjust to each other, 
largely in response to gestures—with the hands, vocal sounds, facial expressions, and so 
on. It is through others’ responses to our gestures that we slowly begin to develop the ca­
pacities for mental symbolization; or in effect, our gestures and the reactions they elicit 
from others come to be represented mentally. Language becomes possible when people 
share a common set of mental symbols, for example, when words call forth the same sym­
bols to both parties in a conversation. Because each of us draws our sense of self from 
others, we are thus thoroughly interrelated. For Mead (1934), “No hard-and-fast line can 
be drawn between our own selves and the selves of others, since our own selves exist and 
enter as such into our experience only in so far as the selves of others exist and enter as 
such in our experience also” (p. 164).
Drawing from an entirely different ontology of the mind, the object relations theorists in 
psychoanalysis reached resonant conclusions. In the early contributions, theorists such as 
Klein, Fairbairn, and Bowlby attempted to amend Freudian drive theory to include the 
emergence of social dispositions. Thus, for example Klein (2002) proposed that the 
process of thinking begins when the infant must compare his/her phantasy with reality, 
and that during the childhood years, life-long dispositions toward the social world are es­
tablished. In more recent years, object relations theory has given over to relational psy­
choanalysis (Mitchell, 1988). Here the focus on the individual’s dispositions toward oth­
ers has been replaced by a major concern with inter-subjective dynamics. As it is rea­
soned, in our relations with each other, we are engulfed by psychic processes of phantasy, 
desire, repression, and unconscious motivation. And because our actions affect each 
other’s psychic life, our subjectivities are inextricably inter-woven.
Yet while challenging on both intellectual and practical grounds, there are (p. 255) rea­
sons to press beyond the inter-subjective account of relational process. Not the least of 
these is the same mind/world dualism inherent in preceding accounts—including the bio/
cognitive. Such a dualism is especially problematic in the case of professional practices 
such as psychotherapy. At the outset is the problem of introspection, that is, how one is to 
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identify one’s own states of mind. How can the mind turn back on itself to discern its dy­
namics, its emotional conditions, its motivations, and so on? Coupled with this problem is 
the hermeneutic challenge of interpreting the conditions of others’ minds. How can one 
justifiably infer psychological states from others’ words or actions? If the only means of 
verifying one’s inferences is through other words and actions, one enters an infinite 
regress of speculation. In effect, once we posit minds within bodies, we confront an in­
tractable enigma of explaining inter-subjective connection.
The Relational Constitution of Self
In the beginning is the relationship.
Martin Buber, I and Thou
There is a third and more radically relational account of essences, one that takes relation­
al process as a fundamental prior to the conception of individual self. The inspiration for 
this orientation comes not from psychology, but linguistic philosophy and literary theory. 
Focal in the former case is Wittgenstein’s (1953) account of the origins of meaning in lan­
guage games. Or effectively, the meaning of any word derives from its use within social 
relations. In the case of literary theory, Mikhail Baktin (1975) has played a critical role in 
his pointing to the way our utterances are not only dependent on a cultural tradition of 
language use, but are also addressed to others in a specific context of interchange. Or 
one might say our actions are made intelligible only by virtue of a relational history and 
are enacted for others with anticipated consequences. For present purposes, there are 
two major consequences of such proposals. First, rather than commencing with the as­
sumption of independent selves from which relationships are derived, we begin with the 
assumption of social process from which the very concept of independent persons may (or 
may not) emerge (Gergen, 2009). Second, in such accounts, the mind-world binary is 
eradicated. Because all statements about the nature of the reality gain their intelligibility 
through discursive traditions, this would include the “reality of mind” (Rorty, 1979). Thus, 
rather than placing mental activity somewhere toward the center of the relational formu­
lation, we may abandon mind-world dualism and allow social process to serve as the es­
sential fulcrum of explanation. That is, we may bracket all accounts of psychological 
states and conditions as essences and reconstitute psychological predicates within the 
sphere of social process.
Within psychology, one important opening to this more radical conception of the relation­
al emerges from contemporary discourse analysis. Such analysis typically focuses on the 
pragmatics of discourse use. In the case of mental discourse, then, the analyst is less con­
cerned with the mental phenomena to which such discourse may or may not refer, than 
with the way it functions within relationships. For example, in Potter and Wetherell’s 
(1987) ground breaking work, the concept of “attitude” is shorn of mental referents and, 
as they see it, serves to index positional claims within social intercourse. An “attitude,” 
then, is essentially a social claim (“I feel . . .” “My view is . . .” “I prefer. . . .”), not an ex­
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ternal expression of an internal impulse. Similarly, Billig (1996) demonstrates how we 
may (p. 256) understand “thinking” not as a mental process, but as a rhetorical skill. By 
the same token, we may understand memory not as a mental event but as the outcome of 
social negotiation. Or as Shotter (1990) proposes, memory is not so much in the head as it 
is a “social achievement.”
Yet it is also clear that the focus on discourse is insufficient. A fully developed account of 
a relational essence would ideally include fully embodied patterns of interdependence 
(Slife, 2004). This has indeed been the direction of my own work (especially Gergen, 
2009). To illustrate, consider the case of emotion. To be sure, emotional discourse terms 
may serve as key elements of conversation (e.g., “That makes me angry,” “Do you love 
me?”). Yet these terms are also embodied, in the sense that without certain patterns of fa­
cial expression, tone of voice, posture and so on, they would lose their intelligibility. In ef­
fect, we may say that emotional expressions are forms of cultural performance. Like lan­
guage, such performances are rendered intelligible by virtue of their cultural history. One 
doesn’t possess an emotion so much as he or she engages in the doing of an emotion. The 
question is not, then, whether one is truly feeling love, sadness, or depression, but 
whether he or she is fully engaged in such performances. And should one be physically 
alone and “feeling an emotion,” he or she would be engaged in a minimal or partial per­
formance (similar to reciting the lines of a play “in one’s head”). In effect, our emotional 
lives depend importantly on relational history.
At the same time, these embodied performances of emotion are also embedded within 
patterns of ongoing interchange. They are entries into the ongoing process of relating. 
We may use the term “relational scenario” in referring to the culturally sedimented pat­
terns of interchange (lived narratives), within which emotional performances can play an 
important role. Thus, for example, the performance of anger (complete with discourse, fa­
cial expressions, postural configurations) is typically embedded within a scenario in 
which a preceding affront may be required to legitimate its meaning as anger. (One can­
not simply shout out in anger for no reason; to do so would be to exit the corridors of in­
telligibility.) Further, one’s performance of anger also sets the stage for the subsequent 
performance of an apology or a defense on the part of another. And if an apology is of­
fered, a common response in Western culture is forgiveness. At that juncture the scenario 
may be terminated. All the actions making up the sequence, from affront to forgiveness, 
require each other to achieve legitimacy. In effect, they are co-constituted (Slife, 2004). 
To be recognizably human is to participate successfully within the dances of relationship.
Relational Being and Future Making
These attempts to generate a more relational conception of human nature are yet in their 
infancy. At the same time, it is not the truth of these accounts that is most important. As 
advanced earlier, it is to their contribution to cultural life that we must turn for evalua­
tion. In this case, the potentials of the relational turn cannot be underestimated. Within 
the Western tradition the individual human being has served as the central rationalizing 
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device for most of our major institutions (e.g., democracy, public education, corporations, 
law). We now confront the possibility of developing intelligibilities that go beyond the 
identification of separable units—I versus you, we versus them—and that may create the 
reality of a more fundamental relatedness, the palpability of inseparability. The tendency 
to view the social world as constituted by individual (p. 257) units—whether selves or 
groups (and by implication ethnicities, classes, institutions and nations)—may be replaced 
by a concern with the relational processes by which the very idea of individual units 
(selves, groups and so on) come into being. The focus moves from the dancers to the 
dance.
To illustrate, consider the longstanding tradition of holding individuals responsible for 
their actions. This presumption is not only built into Western systems of law, but on the 
level of everyday life, rationalizes our attempts to reinforce the social order. Yet we are al­
so well aware that these same traditions of individual responsibility are often alienating. 
The discourse of blame functions much like criticism, in that the target is typically de­
graded, set apart from the community that judges. In the process of blame, the vast sea of 
complexity in which any action is submerged is removed from view, and the single individ­
ual serves as the sole origin of the untoward act.
Yet if we shift our sites from the individual to relational process a range of new possibili­
ties emerge. We may indeed begin to think in terms of relational responsibility, that is, 
how it is that we can sustain the process of meaning making without which all that we 
hold as intelligible or valuable decays (McNamee and Gergen 1999). Here we may begin 
to seek alternatives to our rituals of individual blame. In what ways can we speak togeth­
er, such that we may replace patterns of blame, mutual recrimination and separation with 
the collaborative generation of meaning? What form of dialogue might alter or terminate 
the unwanted action but simultaneously sustain a relationship of mutual respect?
The shift from individual to relational responsibility is but one conceptual leap of great 
promise. We begin to ask new questions and generate new visions of action. Consider as 
well the following vistas opened by a conception of relational essence:
• Political life is typically constructed in terms of oppositions, with one party, group, or 
faction pitted against another. The traditional construction of separation now gives 
way to possibilities of shared investments. Or more generally we may think in terms of 
moving from a competitive to a relational politics. Here we move from we versus them
to we together, which means placing the primary emphasis on decision making in the 
context of relations with the greater society. In relational politics, party loyalty gives 
way to concerns for the greater array of societal relations of which party members are 
a part.
• Identity is not derived from the nature of the world. (There are no necessary or nat­
ural distinctions among persons or groups.) Rather, identity is a relational achieve­
ment. Invited, then, is an obscuring of the demarcation lines separating either individ­
uals or groups (e.g., professional, political, ethnic, national, religious). Invited are con­
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cepts and practices that enable a continuous flow of meaning making across all bound­
aries.
• Prejudice does not originate in the individual mind. Prejudicial action is meaningful 
only within culturally specific traditions. As the traditions are handed down through 
history so is prejudicial action invited. In this sense, all of us are capable of prejudicial 
actions. By the same token, we are all capable of loving, caring, and communally re­
sponsible action. The challenge is to selectively cultivate and transform practices of re­
lationship.
• We may challenge the view that there is a natural (biological, genetic) basis for inter-
group antagonism (as socio-biologists, ethologists, and Freudians are (p. 258) wont to 
argue). Violence is a meaningful integer in a relational dance; this dance is rooted in 
historical convention and is subject to change both on the grass-roots and policy lev­
els. To avoid the outbreak of hostilities requires stepping out of the traditional dances 
and locating alternatives to the rituals of we versus them.
• Societal transformation is not a matter of changing minds and hearts, political val­
ues, or the sense of the good. Rather, transformation will require unleashing the posi­
tive potential inherent in relational process. The challenge is to create relational prac­
tices that enable collective transformation.
Nor are these simply idle visions. One may now locate multiple contexts in which relation­
al theory now informs, nourishes, and inspires the development of cultural practices. In 
the area of conflict resolution, for example, there is a significant movement toward creat­
ing new and more promising forms of dialogue (Sampson et al., 2010). In the domain of 
organizational change, there are attempts to replace command and control as the stimu­
lus to change with practices of inclusion from which the organization’s future is charted 
(Cooperrider et al., 1999). Many therapists are now replacing the traditional metaphor of 
therapy as medical cure with practices emphasizing the collaborative creation of new re­
alities (see, for example, McLeod, 1997; Westerman & Steen, 2007). In education, there 
are significant moves toward expanding dialogic and collaborative forms of pedagogy 
(Dragonas et al., 2015). In effect, the relational metaphor of essence is entering directly 
into cultural life to inform its practices. And there is good reason to anticipate an increas­
ing need for relational accounts of human essence. This is so because the technologies of 
today—television, internet, cell phones, jet transportation, and social media, among oth­
ers—bring the world’s peoples together as never before. Everywhere we confront cultural 
differences, innovation, and demands for adaptation. The resulting need for theoretical 
deliberation on relational process is acute.
Conclusion
If concepts of human essence are culturally constructed, we may not only anticipate but 
also welcome multiple and non-convergent perspectives. Each perspective represents a 
cultural tradition, harbors values, and invites a range of actions. In this context we may 
suspend the question of empirical justification and take a more pragmatic orientation. In 
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effect, what do these various perspectives offer to the culture? On this account, attempts 
to amass research support are far less important than pursuing the potentials of the theo­
retical vision for enriching the future of society. By way of illustration, I have raised criti­
cal questions about the now-dominant view of persons as essentially bio-cognitive in na­
ture. In contrast, I have outlined the development of a relational orientation to human ac­
tion, one that places relational process over individual functioning in our understanding. I 
have proposed that such a perspective replaces the implicit conservativism of the bio-cog­
nitive position with an invitation to create forms of dialogic and collaborative practices 
that are vitally needed for global well-being.
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